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Abstract: On July 30, 2019 a draft Lobbying Act was approved by the government of the Czech 
Republic, which refl ects growing tendencies to adopt at least minimum normative standards in this 
area. The aim of the article is to evaluate the lobbying regulatory system in the draft Lobbying Act 
and its comparison with regulation models in selected European countries through a quantitative 
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transparency rate, the specialized Hired Guns methodology (CPI Index) is used. Costs which are 
needed to achieve, maintain and control a lobbying regulatory system are quantifi ed by means of 
a methodology by Krsmanovic (CII Index). The CPI Index together with the CII Index (the Ninefold 
theory) provides comprehensive and robust assessment of specifi c regulatory models, but also 
improves comparative assessment of lobbying regulations in different jurisdictions of selected 
countries. The current situation in the Czech Republic can be characterized as the existence of 
non-transparent lobbying. The regulatory system represents a lowly regulated system (CPI = 0)/
lowly burdensome system (CII = 0). The regulatory system in the government draft Lobbying Act 
intended to be achieved corresponds to the defi nition of a medium regulated system (CPI = 34*)/
medium burdensome system (CII = 35*). When compared with selected EU countries – Slovakia, 
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Introduction
On July 30, 2019, the government of the Czech 
Republic passed a draft Lobbying Act which 
was drawn up in accordance with the current 
Program Declaration of the Government of 
the Czech Republic, the Government Plan of 
Legislative Works for 2018 and Government 
Resolution No. 114 of 21st February 2018, 
approving the material proposal of the 
Lobbying Act. According to the Government’s 
Concept of the Fight Against Corruption for 
the years 2018 to 2022 (Government of the 
Czech Republic, 2018) “the intention of the 
government is to enable the public access to 
the information about the contact of politicians 
and high offi cials with lobbyists and at the same 
time relieve legitimate lobbying from negative 
connotations with which it is perceived by the 
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public”. The aim of the article is to evaluate the 
lobbying regulation system in the draft Lobbying 
Act in the Czech Republic and to compare it 
with regulation models in selected European 
countries. A partial aim is to complement 
the assessment included in the Final Report 
on Regulatory Impact Assessment with 
a quantitative cost-benefi t analysis by means of 
Ninefold theory.
According to the Transparency International 
CR (2015), lobbying is an integral part of 
healthy democracy, closely linked to universal 
values such as freedom of expression or the 
right to address the institutions and bodies. 
At the same time, it defi nes lobbying as: “any 
direct or indirect communication with public 
government offi cials and with politicians with 
the aim to infl uence decision making in the 
public sphere, performed by any organized 
group or in its interest”. In the recommendation 
by the Council of Europe (2017), lobbying is 
defi ned in the following way: “Lobbying is the 
enforcement of certain interests by means of 
communicating with public authorities as part 
of structured and organized activities with the 
aim to infl uence decision-making processes.” 
OECD (2009a) in their fi rst report on lobbying 
state: “Lobbying is specifi c effort to infl uence 
public decision making either by means of 
pressure to make changes in current policies 
or to prevent such changes. Public decision 
making is an activity a civil servant at any level 
of public administration who makes decision 
on any aspects of a policy, measure or the 
implementation of such a policy is involved in.” 
A defi nition which is often considered as the 
most precise is that by Graziano (2001, p. 248): 
“Lobbying is a specialised and professional 
representation of interests by means of a wide 
variety of tools which in principle eliminates 
a corruptive change of services. It is by its 
nature very different from a general non-
specialised representation provided by elected 
representatives. As a representative of particular 
interests, a lobbyist provides information and 
technically-professional expertise which can 
be useful and sometimes decisive for defi ning 
legislative and administrative regulation.” 
Laboutková and Žák (2010) delimited the 
basic attributes of lobbying when “lobbying is 
fi rst of all focused on advancing interests, it 
is indispensable source information and the 
biggest problem is to distinguish lobbying from 
corruption”.
In modern democracy, lobbying is desirable 
for society as it enables various lobbies to 
participate in the creation and implementation 
of decisions and policies and it enables them to 
present their opinions (Berg & Freund, 2015). 
At the same time, lobbying is an information 
channel by means of which public authorities are 
better informed about relevant facts. Affecting 
representatives of the public power with the aim 
to infl uence their decisions is, unfortunately, not 
always transparent and according to clear rules, 
which brings the risk of the public interests 
being manipulated in favour of hidden partial 
interests. According to an international survey 
(Transparency International, 2013a), non-
transparent lobbying is considered one of the 
main corruption risks which Europe faces. Six 
out of ten Europeans consider their government 
in the country considerably infl uenced or even 
controlled by hidden interests, which is also 
confi rmed by a Transparency International 
report of 2015 (Transparency International, 
2015). Strengthening the transparency of 
the legislation and decision making process 
helps to reveal the infl uence and the relations 
between lobbyists and lobbies on the one 
hand and public entities on the other hand, 
which should contribute to the reduction of 
negative impact often connected with lobbying, 
such as corruption, confl ict of interests, 
protection and clientelism. Bigger openness 
and transparency in formulation, development 
and decision making about public policies is 
however considered crucial for ensuring more 
effi cient public administration. A survey among 
European politicians and offi cers (Burson-
Marsteller, 2013) suggests that 89% of them 
agree that ethical and transparent lobbying is 
benefi cial for policy development. According to 
OECD (2013), creating limits for transparent 
lobbying is crucial for the integrity of the public 
decision-making process.
Setting up suffi cient, effi cient and 
enforceable lobbying regulation represents 
a very diffi cult task for legislators. One of the 
reasons is the extent of lobbying, or of all the 
activities which can be considered lobbying. 
There are a number of options how to set up the 
regulation – from purely non-legislative, such 
as an ethics code or public diaries, through 
gift regulations and lobbyist register, including 
meeting reporting and the so called legislative 
footprint to regulation by means of the law 
which can provide legal framework for the 
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individual tools and combine them in different 
ways. An important reason for improving the 
tools for lobbying transparency increase is 
the dynamics of lobbying regulation activity, 
especially in Europe. Laboutková and Vymětal 
(2018) offered a methodological proposal 
for evaluating transparency of lobbying and 
created an innovative catalogue of lobbying 
transparency where the transparency in lobbying 
is conceptualized in broader environment as 
an alternative to current forms of evaluating 
transparency in lobbying. The catalogue 
contains four main categories: lobbyists, 
targets of lobbying, sunshine principles and 
monitoring and sanctioning. Regulation can 
be supportive of market transactions and 
may result in signifi cant economic, social and 
environmental benefi ts. At the same time, ill-
designed regulation can have appreciable 
economic costs, leading to the concept of the 
“regulatory burden”. According to Stacey (2011), 
“The question of lobbying exceeds the scope 
of a single act.” The combination of rules for 
political party funding, disclosing the property 
and income of individual offi cers and public 
offi cials, bigger transparency and personal 
responsibility when awarding public contracts 
and within the legislation process, bigger 
responsibility and transparency of businesses 
and associations, and also public access to 
information for anti-corruption organizations, 
media and the public is the way to effectively 
prevent the abuse of lobbying. To achieve this, 
mainly a higher level of civic responsibility of all 
the above-mentioned process participants is 
essential.
1. Literature Review and Methods 
of the Research
A standard tool for the assessment of lobbying 
regulation impact in developed European 
countries is the Regulatory Impact Assessment 
(RIA). The aim of RIA is to determine the best 
option to achieve the objective of a rulemaking 
activity while minimising potential negative 
impacts (EASA, 2011). The economic rationale 
for the use of RIA derives from its expected impact 
increasing the effectiveness and effi ciency of 
regulatory interventions and thus economic 
welfare (OECD, 2009b). RIA is a comparative 
process; it is based on determining the 
underlying regulatory objectives sought and 
identifying all the policy interventions that are 
capable of achieving them. As a methodology, 
Cost-Benefi t Analyses represents “the best 
practice” for RIA. According to Hwang (2016, 
p. 76) they are “a benefi t and cost defi ned in 
terms of change of human welfare or utility 
and are measured by individuals’ willingness-
to-pay for a benefi t and willingness-to-accept 
for a cost”. Because it is based on quantifying 
benefi ts and costs in monetary terms and 
comparing them over a suitable period of 
time, it provides a strong basis for comparing 
alternatives and for guiding decision-makers on 
the likely implications of different options. It is 
very common in RIA to fi nd out that important 
benefi ts and costs cannot be quantifi ed (OECD, 
2014). However, if the CBA approach is used in 
such cases, a “partial” CBA can be generated. 
This can still be very useful for decision-makers 
as it narrows the range of issues that must be 
dealt with through a more subjective, qualitative 
analysis. Thus, developing even an incomplete 
CBA can greatly improve decision-making. 
Even where it is able to quantify relatively few 
costs (or benefi ts), using CBA’s systematic 
approach to try to ensure that all benefi ts and 
costs have been identifi ed and assessed will 
help to improve the quality of advice provided 
to decision-makers. In the RIA world, costs 
are usually addressed differently depending 
on various factors such as the availability 
of data, relevance and scope of regulation, 
the size of the market affected, etc. The term 
“regulatory costs” as used by the OECD (2014) 
embraces all the costs attributable to the 
adoption of a regulatory requirement, whether 
direct or indirect in nature and whether borne 
by business, consumers, government and its 
respective authorities (i.e. taxpayers) or other 
groups. The problem with application of the 
cost-benefi t aspects, when it comes to lobbying, 
comes from the nature of benefi ts associated 
with lobbying regulation (Krsmanovic, 2014). 
Benefi ts associated with the regulation of 
lobbying could be summarized under the 
concepts of transparency, accountability and 
deliberative democracy. All three elements 
represent non-economic benefi ts, and thus, 
they are very hard to directly assess and 
measure in monetary terms. This is pretty much 
the case with the regulation of lobbying, where 
societies tend to regulate lobbying almost 
exclusively driven by non-economic reasons. 
According to the OECD (2002, p. 47), “...RIA’s 
most important contribution to the quality of 
decisions is not the precision of the calculations 
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used, but the action of analysing questioning, 
understanding real world impacts and exploring 
assumptions.”
1.1 Methods to Measure Benefi ts from 
Lobbying Regulation
The qualitative and quantitative evaluation of 
lobbying regulation – strictness, restrictiveness, 
strength or direction, or the development of rules 
in time – is addressed by rather a small number of 
scientifi c publications and professional literature. 
For a particular quantitative evaluation, usually 
defi ned indexes and evaluation scales are used. 
The fi rst index which was used in the USA for 
the measurement of the strictness of lobbying 
regulation was Opheim’s Index (1991). This index 
mainly shows that the strictness of regulation of 
lobbyists depends on the administrative capacity 
of lawmakers. The second important index, 
Brinig et al. Index (1993) was more focused 
on the evaluation of restrictiveness of lobbyist 
regulations. The most frequently used tool 
for the evaluation of lobbying regulation at 
present is the Index of Newmark (2005), which 
analyses the development of the strictness of 
lobbying in time. All three tools were primarily 
designed for the purpose of lobbyist activity 
analysis in the USA, both on the federal as well 
as state level, with the focus on transparency 
degree measurement. Signifi cant European 
deeds include a publication by Transparency 
International (2015), which summarises the 
outcome of 19 national reports which evaluated 
the situation in the area of lobbying in 2014 and 
the attempts at its regulation across Europe. 
The evaluation methodology was based on 
internationally recognized standards in the area 
of lobbying regulation and preventive measures 
against unfair interference. These standards are 
set for example by the following OECD (2013) 
documents The 10 Principles for Transparency 
and Integrity in Lobbying, and then also by 
the Venice Commission report (Council of 
Europe, 2013), Open Governance Scorecard 
Standards (Transparency International, 
2013b), rules prepared by Sunlight Foundation 
(2013) and standards prepared by Access 
Info Europe (2013). Based on this foundation, 
a methodology was prepared containing 65 
indicators in three dimensions which are 
transparency, integrity and equality of access.
An index, which is most often used on 
a global scale for evaluating and comparing 
the lobbying regulation, is the CPI (Center for 
Public Integrity, 2011). This index is defi ned on 
the basis of Opheim’s Index and Brinig et al. 
Index. The CPI enables to evaluate lobbying 
regulations more deeply and systematically. 
The results of regulatory rules evaluation refer 
to transparency and responsibility, and both the 
indicators can be considered non-monetary 
benefi ts of lobbying regulation from the point of 
view of RIA. The main weakness of the CPI and 
also of the previous options from the RIA point 
of view is the fact that they focus only on the 
component of strength which can be connected 
with the benefi ts of lobbying rules, but they 
completely leave out the cost components 
which are of the same importance for the 
assessment of the regulation impact. Another 
limiting factor of the CPI typology is the fact that 
it is not able to completely refl ect the specifi c 
character of the regulation by means of soft law 
and focuses only on the rules structure and not 
on the real level of regulation observance and 
enforcement. The basis of the CPI methodology 
selected is formed by a thorough qualitative 
analysis of relevant regulatory documents. 
The quantitative part of the research resides in 
the division of 48 questions in total into eight 
key areas: defi nition of lobbyists, individual 
registration, individual spending disclosure, 
employer spending disclosure, electronic fi lling, 
public access, enforcement and revolving door 
provision. The individual answers are given 
specifi c numerical values (point score) and the 
maximum attainable number of points is 100. 
The CPI methodology generally assumes that 
the higher the point score of a system is, the 
closer it gets to the ideal of the full transparency, 
public access and responsibility. At the same 
time, the authors emphasise that a “high” 
CPI score does not need to mean a better 
regulatory solution and vice versa. On the basis 
of the evaluation of individual jurisdictions in 
the area of lobbying regulation, a classifi cation 
was introduced into the original methodology 
including the following levels: satisfactory (70 
points and more), borderline (60–69 points) 
and unsatisfactory (under 60 points). Chari, 
Murphy and Hogan (2011, p. 29) followed up 
the original concept by creating a “threefold 
classifi cation” typology according to the point 
score (strictness/strength) where systems with 
low lobbying regulation achieve 1–29 points, 
systems with medium regulation 30–59 points 
and a highly regulated systems 60 points and 
more. They also tried to defi ne the main features 
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of the individual theoretical types and describe 
typical trends in lobbying regulation with impact 
on transparency and responsibility. Chari, 
Murphy and Hogan (2011, pp. 25–26) published 
the results of lobbying regulation evaluation 
from 2010. On the basis of the point evaluation, 
in 2010 Hungary (CPI = 45 points) and Austria 
(CPI = 33 points) belonged among systems with 
medium lobbying regulation intensity, Poland 
(CPI = 27 points) ranked among countries with 
a low lobbying regulation system. Only the 
US with CPI of 62 points was a country with 
a high lobbying system regulation. Moderately 
regulated systems of lobbying in 2010 operated 
in Canada (CPI = 50 points), Lithuania (CPI = 44 
points) and Slovenia (CPI = 35 points). Poland 
(CPI = 27 points), France (CPI = 19 points) and 
Germany (CPI = 17 points) showed a low level 
of lobbying regulation under the CPI systems.
1.2 Methods to Measure Costs 
of Lobbying Regulation
Regulatory rules themselves create costs 
as a result of negotiation and information 
activities which the subjects of regulation as 
well as executors of regulatory measures 
incur. Apart from these direct and relatively 
easily measurable costs, also other costs are 
related to lobbying regulation which a company 
incurs as a result of changes in rules in lobbyist 
activities, such as costs related to the increased 
competition between lobbyists as a result of 
increased transparency (Denter, Morgan, & 
Sisak, 2011). Current scientifi c literature brings 
only one original methodology focused on the 
quantifi cation of costs connected with lobbying 
regulation, and it is a methodology defi ned in 
Krsmanovic (2014) A Law and Economics 
Analysis of Lobbying Regulation: Towards an 
optimal structure through the Cost Indicator 
Index. The main principle of this methodology is 
the defi nition of the CII (Cost-Indicator Index), 
which was created in combination with the CPI 
and together they can be used to evaluate the 
benefi ts and costs of lobbying regulation. The 
CII thus respects the RIA methodology, CPI 
methodology and also the methodology of the 
Threefold theory and it is thus suitable for the 
analysis of regulatory measures within the 
legislation of individual countries and, at the 
same time, it represents a tool for ex-ante and 
ex-post evaluation of lobbying regulation. Fig. 
1 provides an overview of the CII methodology 
structure, its pillars (left side) and sources (right 
side).
The Cost Indicator Index CII consists of 47 
individual questions (Krsmanovic, 2014), where 
questions 1–26 are related to the burden 
imposed on the private sector and questions 
27–47 are related to the burden imposed 
Fig. 1: CII methodology structure
Source: Krsmanovic (2014, p. 105)
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on the public sector. The reached values of 
the index are in the range 0–288 points. The 
depth of the analysis that the CII provides is 
in compliance with the depth of the analysis 
provided by the CPI method, and if fast and 
easily comparable use of both the scales is to 
be ensured, it is necessary to unite the scale 
at the interval 0–100 points, which can be 
achieved by a simple division of the CII value 
by 2.88. If subsequently the same methodology 
of the CII Threefold theory is applied to CII, 
it is possible to divide the systems which 
qualitatively and quantitatively classify lobbyist 
regulations into systems with a low regulatory 
burden (CII in the range of 1–29 points), 
systems with a medium burden of lobbying 
regulation (CII value amounting to 30–69 points) 
and highly burdened systems in terms of costs 
(CII value in the range 70–100 points). With 
regards to the fact that it is desirable to keep 
the cost burden of a lobbying regulation system 
as low as possible, lower CII levels represent 
a better alternative than high CII scores.
To assess regulatory quality, it is necessary 
to evaluate two key elements – benefi ts 
and costs, which means the interconnection 
of the Threefold theory of classifi cation of 
lobbying regulation (based on the CPI) and 
the CII Threefold theory of classifi cation of 
lobbying regulation (based on the CII). This 
interconnection represents a new platform for 
the qualitative and quantitative evaluation of 
the adopted acts related to lobbying and of 
draft acts – The Ninefold theory (Krsmanovic, 
2014). On the basis of the Ninefold theory it 
is possible to structure lobbying regulation 
systems into nine different types according to 
their qualitative and quantitative characteristics 
acquired by the CPI and CII application. On 
the basis of the assumption that in the case 
of lobbyist regulation, the society will give 
preference to the biggest possible transparency 
and responsibility while attempting to minimize 
costs, then regulatory measures which have 
higher benefi ts than costs (CPI is bigger 
than CII) can be considered good. Medium 
categories when the CPI and CII values are 
in the same intervals represent acceptable 
regulation systems. Unacceptable options of 
lobbying regulation are characterised by costs 
higher than acquired benefi ts (CPI is smaller 
than CII). At the same time, the evaluation of 
costs on the “low, medium and high” level on 
the basis of the Ninefold theory classifi cation 
enables to compare different jurisdictions 
regardless of the monetary expression, which 
is a signifi cant advantage in comparison with 
regulation assessment based on RIA. In the 
comparative analysis of lobbyist regulation, 
RIA procedures are not commonly applicable 
because they often differ signifi cantly in the 
approach to evaluation, in the type of evaluation, 
its extent, depth and descriptiveness.
2. Research Results
To evaluate a regulatory system from the 
viewpoint of strength which it has, and the 
transparency rate which it generates, the 
specialized Hired Guns methodology (CPI 
Index) is used. Costs which are needed to 
achieve, maintain and control a lobbying 
regulatory system are quantifi ed by means of 
a methodology by Krsmanovic (CII Index). The 
CII Index together with the CPI Index provide 
comprehensive and robust assessment of 
specifi c regulatory models – the current state in 
the Czech Republic and the governmental draft 
Lobbying Act, but also improve comparative 
assessment of lobbying regulations in selected 
European countries – Slovakia, Hungary, 
Poland, Slovenia and Austria. The results are 
achieved on the basis of ex post evaluation of 
their current laws or rules of lobbying regulation. 
The Ninefold theory enables to compare these 
different jurisdictions, which is a signifi cant 
advantage in comparison with regulation 
evaluation based on RIA.
2.1 Assessment of the Current 
Situation in Lobbying Regulation 
in the Czech Republic by Means 
of the Ninefold Theory
In the Czech Republic, with regards to its 
historical development, lobbying does not 
have long tradition – it started to develop 
in the context of democratic transformation 
after 1989. Despite attempts at its regulation, 
which would contribute to higher quality 
and professionalism of lobbying, the Czech 
Republic still belong among countries where 
there is no regulation in this area. The 
current state in the Czech Republic can be 
characterized as a situation of the existence 
of non-transparent lobbying without adopting 
any measures to increase decision-making 
and legislative process transparency. The risk 
arising from retaining the non-transparency 
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state is negative impact on the creation of 
public policies and adoption of decisions 
from the view point of potential advancing 
of hidden interests or giving preference to 
certain interests over others, and also on the 
public whose confi dence in these processes 
decrease. Public decisions or activities of public 
institutions then lose their legitimacy. Other 
risks include democracy erosion, decrease of 
citizens’ confi dence in politics, political parties 
and institutions. It can be assumed that the 
problems of the current condition will become 
worse and deeper, namely (Government Offi ce 
of the Czech Republic, 2019): the lingering 
low transparency of the legislation process 
which will lead to gradually deteriorating 
quality of legal regulations, pressure coming 
from interests groups and aiming at reaching 
such legislation which would be advantageous 
mainly for the groups themselves, consequently 
to this, the quality of business environment will 
deteriorate and also the attractiveness of the 
CR not only for foreign investors but also for 
Czech companies, low level of decision-making 
processes transparency (strategic planning, 
awarding tenders, etc.) in public administration 
and low level of control over the infl uence on 
decision making of entities in public power. 
The costs and benefi ts of the zero option can 
be quantifi ed only with diffi culty and only by 
means of expert estimation. Direct costs would 
arise in the case of unsuccessful international 
arbitrations, in the case of reduced tax revenue 
caused by the outfl ow of businesses form the 
country, or if small businesses become more 
diffi cult to run or if the rating and evaluation 
of the country by the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund worsened, which 
would lead to the reduction of international 
investments (Bednářová, 2018a). Direct 
benefi ts associated with maintaining the current 
state are the absence of regulatory costs 
incurred by the addressees of the regulation 
and the public sector and preservation of the 
existing administration. Indirect benefi ts can be 
seen in not interfering with the private sector 
of individuals in the form of personal data 
disclosure (Bednářová, 2018b). As there is no 
regulation, it is not possible to quantitatively 
evaluate either benefi ts or costs. The current 
situation in lobbying regulation in the CR thus 
represents a Lowly regulated system (CPI = 0)/
lowly burdensome system (CII = 0).
The need of institutional lobbying regulation 
results from the increase in the complexity of 
governing leading to the growing signifi cance of 
expert opinion in decision-making processes. 
Since 2004, four unsuccessful attempts at 
lobbying regulation have been recorded, out of 
which one was a draft ethics code and three 
draft acts while the last draft act failed to be 
passed by the Parliament of the CR in 2012. The 
current draft Lobbying Act (Government Offi ce 
of the Czech Republic, 2019) was approved 
by the government on July 30, 2019 and as 
part of the legislation process it continues to 
the Parliament. If the Parliament passes the 
draft act, it is expected to come into effect 
on January 1, 2021 (Government Offi ce of 
the Czech Republic, 2019, §18). The Czech 
Republic is thus supposed to become the 
eighth country in the EU which will introduce 
legal lobbying regulation, which is already 
in force in Ireland, the UK, France, Austria, 
Slovenia, Poland and Lithuania. The EU law 
does not regulate lobbying on a national level, 
it is a legal area which is fully in competence of 
member states.
According to the current initiative, the 
aim of the draft lobbying regulation is mainly 
to “set transparent rules for lobbying and to 
defi ne lobbying as a standard activity within 
the legislation and decision-making process on 
a central level”. The submitted draft Lobbying 
Act defi nes lobbying and sets its scope both in 
a positive and negative way. It further defi nes 
the circle of lobbyists, the lobbied, lobbying 
means and the powers of public authorities 
in the fi eld of lobbying. A register of lobbyists 
and the lobbied is being established and the 
procedures of entering and deleting from 
the register are being set. In the draft act it 
further says that lobbying regulation needs to 
be approached rationally in such a way that 
it will represent mainly: “cost-effective and 
legislatively adequate solution corresponding 
to the set intention” (Government Offi ce of the 
Czech Republic, 2019).
The government proposal contains a Final 
Report on RIA related the draft Lobbying Act 
and to the draft act amending certain laws in 
connection with the adoption of the Lobbying 
Act (Government Offi ce of the Czech Republic, 
2019). The Report contains the assessment 
of the regulation proposal impact on the 
state budget and other public budgets, on 
international competitiveness, on business 
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environment, on territorial self-governing units. 
It further assesses social impact, impact on 
consumers, impact on the environment, impact 
in relation to the ban of discrimination and 
gender equality, impact on the performance 
of the State Statistical Service, impact on the 
security or defence of the State, and considers 
corruption risks. In the Report, the authors 
assessed possible regulation alternatives 
which differ from each other regarding the 
combination of the individual tools and the 
scope, or the effect of the potential rules. 
The alternative being assessed is zero Option I 
(existing condition of the unregulated lobbying 
without changes), Option II (non-legislation 
option which includes the creation and adoption 
of an ethics code for members of parliament, 
senators and government members), 
Option III (comprising legislation measures 
supplemented by non-legislation measures) 
and Option IV (a wide option including lobbying 
in its common defi nition including the level of 
municipality and regional authorities). In this 
case, RIA assessment method was mainly 
a qualitative analysis, because it is diffi cult 
to quantify expected benefi ts (e.g. a positive 
signal towards the society about the effort to 
set ethical standard, increase in transparency 
after a public diary is implemented, increase in 
transparency of lobbying activities, introduction 
of a legislation footprint as a standard in the 
legislation process (CR), but also the majority 
of the related costs (e.g. high demands on 
public offi cials’ moral integrity, intervention 
into the privacy of natural persons in the form 
of disclosure of their data in the registry of 
lobbyists, formality and a low information value 
of the data included in the legislation footprint, 
diffi culty to foresee the effi ciency of government 
and parliament measures). Predictable 
quantifi able costs thus include mainly costs of 
the establishment and operation of a register 
of lobbyists, costs of the public sector related 
to the supervision over the compliance with 
the regulation, the increase in fi nancial and 
administrative costs of entities entered into the 
register, the increase in administrative costs of 
public offi cials when collecting and entering data 
representing the basis for a legislation footprint, 
or cost of the establishment of a special section 
in the Notifi cation register under the Confl ict 
of Interest Act. The Government Offi ce of the 
Czech Republic (RIA, 2019) concludes that: 
“according to the assessment of benefi ts and 
costs, Option III is assessed and a solution 
which meets the purpose and meaning of the 
regulation being prepared while maintaining an 
acceptable level of administrative and fi nancial 
requirements”.
2.2 Assessment of the Draft Lobbying 
Act by Means of the Ninefold 
Theory
In the proposed regulation from the RIA 
point of view, benefi ts are assessed only 
qualitatively. When the Hirend Gunds method 
for the assessment of the proposed regulation 
was applied, the CPI reached 34 points, as 
illustrated in Tab. 1. In Tab. 1, only the questions 
where answers with a non-zero score were 
detected are included. Questions where there 
were zero-score answers are not included (for 
a complete CPI methodology see CPI, 2011).
CPI (draft Lobbying Act) CZ*
Defi nition of a lobbyist
1.  In addition to legislative lobbyists, does the defi nition recognize executive 
branch lobbyists? No – 0 points; Yes – 3 points 3 [§2 (1), §3]
2.  How much does an individual have to make/spend to qualify as a lobbyist or to 
prompt registration as a lobbyist, according to the defi nition? More than $500 
– 0 points; More than $100 – 1 point; More than $50 – 2 points; $50 or less – 3 
points; Lobbyists qualify and must register no matter how much money made/
spent – 4 points
4 [§6 (3)]
Individual registration
3.  Is a lobbyist required to fi le a registration form? No – 0 points; Yes – 3 points 3 [§6 (1)]
Tab. 1: The assessment of the regulation system of the Lobbying Act according to the CPI methodology – Part 1
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Using the CPI, it is possible to compare 
the proposed regulatory system with the 
current condition of non-regulated lobbying by 
means of eight defi ned key areas. In the Czech 
Republic, there has not been a legally defi ned 
concept of lobbyist so far. In the draft Lobbying 
Act (Government Offi ce of the Czech Republic, 
2019, §3) a lobbyist is defi ned as “a person of 
CPI (draft Lobbying Act) CZ*
4.  How many days can lobbying take place before registration is required? 16 or 
more days – 0 points; 11 to 15 days – 1 point; 6 to 10 days – 2 points; 1 to 5 
days – 3 points; 0 days – 4 points
4 [§6 (2)]
5.  Is subject matter or bill number to be addressed by a lobbyist required on 
registration forms? No bill number/subject matter required – 0 points; Subject 
matter only required – 1 point; Bill number required – 3 points
3 [§12 (2-e)]
7.  Within how many days must a lobbyist notify the oversight agency of changes in 
registration? 16–or more days – 0 points; 11–15 days – 1 point; 6–10 days – 2 
points; 1–5 days – 3 points; 0 days – 4 points
2 [§9 (1, 2)]
9.  Is a lobbyist required to identify by name each employer on the registration 
form? No – 0 points; Yes – 1point 1 [§12 (2-d)]
Individual spending disclosure
25.  Is a lobbyist who has done no spending during a fi ling period required to make 
a report of no activity? No – 0 points; Yes – 1 point 1 [§12 (3)]
Employer spending disclosure
Electronic fi lling
28.  Does the oversight agency provide lobbyists/employers with online 
registration? No – 0 points; Yes – 1 point 1 [§5 (1)]
30.  Does the oversight agency provide training about how to fi le registrations/
spending reports electronically? No – 0 points; Yes – 1 point 1 [§5 (2)]
Public access
31.  Location/format of registrations or active lobbyist directory:  Photocopies from 
offi ce only – 1 point; PDF or image fi les on the Web – 2 points; Searchable 
database on the Web – 3 points; Downloadable fi les/database – 4 points
2 [§5 (2)]
34.  Are sample registration forms/spending reports available on the Web? No – 0 
points; Yes – 1 point 1 [§5 (2)]
38.  How often are lobby lists updated? Semi-annually or less often – 1 point; 
Monthly – 2 points; Weekly – 3 points; Daily – 4 points 2 [§6 (4)]
Enforcement
39. Does the state have statutory auditing authority? No – 0 points; Yes – 2 points 2 [§15]
40.  Does the state agency conduct mandatory reviews or audits? No – 0 points; 
Yes – 2 points 2 [§16 (5–7)]
41.  Is there a statutory penalty for late fi ling of lobby registration form? No – 0 
points; Yes – 1 point 1 [§16 (2-c)]
44.  Is there a statutory penalty for incomplete fi ling of a lobby registration form? 
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law and integrity who makes a declaration that 
he/she intends to lob in the interest of a third 
party or in his/her own interest”. Lobbyists 
have a duty to register regardless of the 
amount they have to make/spend. Under the 
draft lobbying act, lobbyists will be obliged to 
fi ll in a registration form within ten days after 
they have commenced their activities at the 
latest. The subject matter and bill number by 
a lobbyist must be included in the registration 
forms. The disclosure of individual expenditures 
is not included in the draft lobbying act. The 
obligation to disclose a report on expenditures 
or to disclose remuneration/salary is not 
considered. At the same time, lobbyists have 
a duty to report no activity. The disclosure of 
the employer’s expenditures is not included 
in the draft Lobbying Act. Electronic fi ling will 
be enabled by means of on-line registration, 
including training on fi lling in the registration 
electronically. Downloadable fi les are a public 
access option in the draft act. At the same time, 
a list of lobbyists will be updated every month. 
The supervision over the compliance with duties 
under the Lobbying Act (Government Offi ce of 
the Czech Republic, 2019, §5) will be performed 
by the Offi ce for the Surveillance of the Political 
Parties and Political Movements, which will be 
authorised to perform surveillance, consider 
offences, or impose sanctions.  The draft act in 
the Czech Republic does not address revolving 
door provisions either. In the new regulation of 
lobbying, what could be criticised is the relatively 
non-standard defi nition of lobbying, lobbyists 
and the lobbied as well as a low level of control 
over the data entered into the Register. A space 
for the tightening of the regulation could be 
found also in the increase in the scope of the 
information required about the entities’ lobbying 
activities themselves or about their funding.
The Final RIA report attached to the draft 
Lobbying Act contains qualitative assessment of 
cost related to Option III. Quantitative assessment 
of costs is limited to the quantifi cation of “the 
costs on the establishment of a register of 
lobbyists and the lobbied, which in this Option 
can be expected to amount to approximately CZK 
500,000–700,000 without VAT… and the costs of 
the operation of the register, including personnel 
costs, which will amount approximately to 
1 million Czech crowns a year”. When the costs 
needed to be spent in relation to the regulation in 
the case of proposed Option III were assessed 
by means of the CII methodology, the index 
amounted to 35 points. Specifi c questions which 
are connected with a non-zero assessment of 
an answer are included in Tab. 2 (questions 
with a zero assessment of the answer are not 
included, for complete methodology CII see 
Krsmanovic, 2014).
The level of regulation which should be 
achieved on the basis of the draft Lobbying 
CII (draft Lobbying Act) CZ*
Defi nition of a lobbyist
1.  How much does an individual have to make/spend to qualify as a lobbyist or 
to prompt registration as a lobbyist, according to the defi nition? Qualifi cation 
threshold: More than $10,000 made – 4 points; Qualifi cation threshold: More 
than $2,500 made – 6 points; Qualifi cation threshold: regardless the amount 
made – 7 points
7
Individual registration
2.  Is a lobbyist required to fi le a registration form? No – 0 points; Yes – 5 points 5
3.  How many days can lobbying take place before registration is required? 6 
months or more – 4 points; Up to a month – 5 points; Up to 3 days – 5 points 5
4.  Is subject matter or bill number to be addressed by a lobbyist required on 
registration forms? No bill number/subject matter required – 0 points; Subject 
matter only required – 4 points; Bill number required – 5 points
5
5.  How often is registration by a lobbyist required? Once only – 2 points; Every 
two years – 4 points; Annually or more often – 4 points 2
Tab. 2: The assessment of the regulatory system of the Lobbying Act according to the CII methodology – Part 1
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Act* thus corresponds to a medium regulated 
system (CPI = 34*)/medium burdensome 
system (CII = 35*) and it represents a signifi cant 
improvement in the area of lobbying regulation 
compared with the current situation in the Czech 
Republic (CPI = 0/CII = 0), as is illustrated in Fig. 2.
CII (draft Lobbying Act) CZ*
6.  Within how many days must a lobbyist notify the oversight agency of changes 
in registration? 6 months or more – 4 points; Up to a month – 5 points; Up to 3 
days – 5 points
5
8.  Is a lobbyist required to identify by name each employer on the registration 
form?
No – 0 points; Yes – 6 points 
6
Individual spending disclosure
24.  Is a lobbyist who has done no spending during a fi ling period required to make 
a report of no activity? No – 0 points; Yes – 4 points 4
Employer spending disclosure
Electronic fi lling
27.  Does oversight agency provide lobbyists/employers with online registration? 
No – 0 points; Yes – 4 points 4
29.  Does oversight agency provide training about how to fi le registrations/
spending reports electronically? No – 0 points; Yes – 4 points 4
Public access
30.  Location/format of registrations or active lobbyist directory: Photocopies from 
offi ce only – 6 points; PDF or image fi les on the Web – 3 points; Searchable 
database on the Web – 4 points; Downloadable fi les/database – 4 points
3
33.  Are sample registration forms/spending reports available the Web? No – 0 
points; Yes – 3 points 3
37.  How often are lobby lists updated? Annually or less often – 6 points; Monthly – 
7 points; Weekly - 7 points 7
38.  In addition to legislative lobbyists, does the defi nition recognize executive 
branch lobbyists? No – 0 points; Yes – 3 points 3
Enforcement
40. Does the state have statutory auditing authority? No – 0 points; Yes – 7 points 7
41.  Does oversight agency conducts mandatory reviews or audits? No – 0 points; 
Yes – 8 points 8
42.  Is there a statutory penalty for late fi ling of lobby registration form? No – 0 
points; Yes – 8 points 8
44.  Is there a statutory penalty for incomplete fi lling of a lobby registration form? 
No – 0 points; Yes – 8 points 8
46.  Structure/type of oversight agency? Already existing administrative unit with 
attributed tasks of enforcement of lobbying rules – 6 points; Entirely new 
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The Ninefold theory method can be used 
to compare regulatory systems in the area of 
lobbying in selected countries. By means of 
this method, it is possible to provide evidence 
whether the government draft Lobbying Act 
contains suffi cient, effi cient and feasible 
measures of lobbying regulation in comparison 
with selected European countries. Fig. 2 
contains regulatory system assessment in 
Hungary, Slovakia, Austria, Poland and 
Slovenia. The relevant information for the 
author’s own calculations was received from 
their national legislation for 2018. In all the 
cases, it is the fi rst and completely unique use of 
the evaluation of costs connected with lobbying 
regulation. Based on the evaluation by Hired 
Guns method CPI and Krsmanovic method 
CII, it can be stated that all the countries fall 
into the category that represents acceptable 
regulatory systems, where CPI and CII are at 
same intervals. Regulatory systems in Hungary 
and the Slovak Republic can be characterized 
as lowly regulated and lowly burdensome 
systems. There are no statutory rules in 
Hungary (CPI = 0/CII = 0), which is refl ected 
in the zero CPI and CII indexes. Lobbying 
regulation was abandoned by the government 
and replaced by Act CXXXI of 2010 on Public 
Participation in Developing Legislation, which 
came into force in January 2011 (EPRS, 2016). 
Related rules in The Government decree on the 
system of integrity management within public 
administration issued in 2013, obliges public 
servants to ask prior permission from their 
superior to meet lobbyists and also to report 
back on the contacts or outcome of meetings. 
There is no mechanism in place targeting 
monitoring of the implementation of these 
obligations. There are no statutory rules in the 
Slovak Republic (CPI = 6/CII = 10); two draft bills 
on lobbying were submitted, however, neither 
of them was approved. The issues of revolving 
door and monitoring and sanctions are partially 
regulated. The other seven key areas included 
in the CPI index are not regulated by legislation. 
Austria has adopted legal regulation of 
lobbying when the Austrian Bundesrat passed 
“Transparenzpaket” (Transparency package) 
on June 2012, which took effect on January 
2013. This package comprises a series of 
transparency-related laws, among them the so 
called “LobbyG” regulating lobbying and interest 
representation and introducing a register 
(EPRS, 2016). Practically the same level of 
lobbying benefi ts as in the Czech Republic* 
is provided by the Austrian regulatory system 
(CPI = 38/CII = 49), but this level of benefi ts 
is achieved by using higher costs which are 
mainly associated with a higher frequency of 
lobbying reports and a higher degree of public 
access and control. The regulatory system in 
Slovenia (CPI = 41/CII = 44) allows to get most 
benefi ts from lobbying regulation out of all the 
countries in the comparison with a reasonable 
cost burden. Compared to other countries, 
the provision and reporting of lobbyists’ gifts 
Highly regulated
Systems (60–100)
High – Low High – Medium High – High
Medium regulated
Systems (30–59)




























Source: own calculation in Laboutková et al. (2020), methodology in Krsmanovic (2014)
Fig. 2: The assessment of the regulation systems according to the Ninefold theory
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is regulated in Slovenia, fast and open public 
access to information in the country works. 
Lobbying activities are regulated in the Integrity 
and Prevention of Corruption Act (EPRS, 
2016). Legislative changes in 2010 and 2011 
focused on integrity and prevention of corrupt 
practices, confl icts of interest, transparency 
of lobbying, whistleblower protection, public 
procurement, criminal law provisions and 
criminal procedure. The Act on Legislative 
and Regulatory Lobbying in Poland passed 
by Sejm in July 2005 came into force in March 
2006 after a number of corruption scandals and 
informal relations between interest groups and 
public offi cials. The Act promotes transparency 
in the law-making process and was amended 
in 2011 (EPRS, 2016). The regulatory system 
in Poland (CPI = 31/CII = 34) is “the weakest” 
in the countries under comparison, the 
defi nition of lobbyist and individual registration 
are regulated; statutory auditing authority 
and revolving door provision are functional. 
Weaknesses can be detected in electronic 
fi lling and public access.
Conclusions
On July 30, 2019 a draft Lobbying Act was 
approved by the government of the Czech 
Republic, which refl ects growing tendencies to 
adopt at least minimum normative standards 
in this area in the EU member countries. The 
aim of the article was to evaluate the lobbying 
regulatory system in the draft Lobbying Act 
in the Czech Republic and its comparison 
with regulation models in selected European 
countries. A partial aim was to complement the 
assessment included in the Final Report on 
RIA with a quantitative cost-benefi t analysis. 
In the article an empiric-analytic approach 
was used to which also the used methodology 
contributes. To evaluate the regulatory system 
from the viewpoint of strength which it has, 
and the transparency rate which it generates, 
the specialized Hired Guns methodology 
of the Centre for Public Integrity was used, 
within which the CPI is defi ned. Based on the 
achieved score of the CPI, lobbying regulatory 
systems are perceived as lowly regulated, 
medium regulated or highly regulated systems. 
Costs which are needed to achieve, maintain 
and control a lobbying regulatory system 
were quantifi ed by means of a methodology 
by Krsmanovic, the main principle of which is 
the creation of the CII. Based on the CII score, 
regulatory systems are divided into lowly 
burdensome systems, systems with a medium 
burden of lobbying regulation and highly 
burdened systems. By means of the mutual 
combination, a new platform was created used 
for assessment and mutual comparison of 
lobbying regulation systems from the viewpoint 
of a cost-benefi t analysis – the Ninefold theory.
The current state in the Czech Republic can 
be characterized as a situation of the existence 
of non-transparent lobbying without adopting 
any measures to increase decision-making 
and legislative process transparency. The 
regulatory system represents a lowly regulated 
system (CPI = 0)/lowly burdensome system 
(CII = 0). The governmental draft Lobbying Act 
regulates conditions of lobbying, obligations of 
lobbyists, the lobbied and lobbying means and 
the powers of public authorities in the fi eld of 
lobbying. The draft regulation is in accordance 
with Option III from the point of view of the Final 
Regulatory Impact Assessment. The regulatory 
system intended to be achieved corresponds 
to the defi nition of a medium regulated system 
(CPI = 34*)/medium burdensome system 
(CII = 35*) and it represents a signifi cant 
improvement in the area of lobbying regulation 
when compared with the current situation.
When compared with selected EU 
countries it can be concluded that the proposed 
regulatory system meets the standard minimum 
regulation requirements related to lobbying 
regulation. If the government draft Lobbying 
Act is passed, the Czech Republic will rank 
behind Slovenia and Austria, on the same level 
of regulation as in Poland and will signifi cantly 
surpass the regulatory systems in Slovakia 
and Hungary. Regulatory systems in Hungary 
(CPI = 0/CII = 0) and Slovakia (CPI = 6/CII = 10) 
can be characterized as lowly regulated and 
lowly burdensome systems. There are no 
statutory rules in both the countries, only the 
issue of revolving door and monitoring and 
sanctions are partially regulated in Slovakia. 
Austria has adopted legal regulation of lobbying 
in 2012. The Austrian regulatory system 
(CPI = 38/CII = 49) belongs among Medium 
regulated systems/Medium burdensome 
systems, as well as lobbying regulatory 
systems in Slovenia and Poland. The regulatory 
system in Slovenia (CPI = 41/CII = 44) allows 
to get most benefi ts from lobbying regulation 
out of all the countries being compared with 
a reasonable cost burden. Lobbying activities 
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are regulated in the Integrity and Prevention of 
Corruption Act (EPRS, 2016) that is focused on 
the integrity and prevention of corrupt practices, 
confl icts of interest and transparency of 
lobbying. The Act on Legislative and Regulatory 
Lobbying in Poland was passed by Sejm in July 
2005 after a number of corruption scandals and 
was amended in 2011. The regulatory system 
in Poland (CPI = 31/CII = 34) is “the weakest” 
among the countries being compared. All 
the selected European countries fall into the 
category that represents acceptable regulatory 
systems, where CPI and CII are at same 
intervals. It is the fi rst evaluation of the lobbying 
regulatory system in the Czech Republic and 
in all other cases it is the fi rst and completely 
unique use of the evaluation of costs connected 
with lobbying regulation.
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